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Abstract 
Due to the limited ability of publicly financed health systems in developing countries to 
provide adequate access to health care, community-based health financing has been 
proposed as a viable option. This has led to the implementation of a number of Community-
Based Health Insurance (CBHI) schemes, in several developing countries. To assess the 
ability of such schemes in meeting their stated objectives, this study systematically reviews 
the existing empirical evidence on three outcomes – access to schemes, effect on health care 
utilization and effect on financial protection. In addition to collating and summarizing the 
evidence we analyse the link between key scheme design characteristics and their effect on 
outcomes and comment on the role that may be played by study characteristics in 
influencing outcomes. The review shows that the ultra-poor are often excluded and at the 
same time there is evidence of adverse selection. The bulk of the studies find that access to 
CBHI is associated with increased health care utilization, especially with regard to the use of 
relatively cheaper outpatient care services as opposed to inpatient care. The schemes also 
appear to mitigate catastrophic healthcare expenditure. There are clear links between scheme 
design and effectiveness suggesting the importance of involving the target population in 
designing and implementing CBHI schemes.  
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1. Introduction 
Increased expenditure caused by the need to cope with injury and illness has been 
identified as one of the main factors responsible for driving vulnerable households further 
into poverty (WHO, 2000).  According to Meghan (2010), more than half of health 
expenditure in poor countries is covered by out-of-pocket (OOP) payments incurred by 
households. An increase in such expenditure can have catastrophic effects and may deplete a 
household’s ability to generate current and future income and have inter-generational 
consequences as households may be compelled to incur debt, sell productive assets, draw 
down buffer food stocks, or sacrifice children’s education. Foregoing medical care may lead 
to long lasting illness, disability or even death (see O’Donnell et al., 2005; De Weerdt and 
Dercon, 2006; Flores et al., 2008).1  
Since the late 1990s, due to the limited ability of publicly financed health systems in 
developing countries to provide adequate access to health care and the shortcomings of 
informal coping strategies to provide financial protection against health shocks, in the 
international development discourse (for instance see WHO, 2000) various forms of 
community-based health care financing have been proposed as an alternative approach.2 This 
increasing policy attention has led to the implementation of a number of Community-Based 
Health Insurance (CBHI) schemes, in several developing countries (Wiesmann and Jutting, 
                                                 
1  The World Health Organization defines health expenditure as catastrophic if the share of a 
household’s total expenditure on health care services is more than 40 percent of household's 
capacity to pay. A household’s capacity to pay is measured by its total non-food expenditure (for 
details, see Karami et al., 2009). 
 
2 The definition of community is often not clear and Dror and Preker (2002, p. 2) treat is as “a 
generic expression used to cover a large variety of health-financing arrangements”.  Based on our 
reading of the literature we define the community in terms of the target population which a particular 
scheme is trying to reach and community-based in terms of involving the community in some or all 
aspects of the scheme. The range of arrangements which are placed under the rubric of Community-
Based Health Insurance schemes is discussed later on in the review. 
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2001; Defourny and Failon, 2008). Typically, such CBHI schemes are non-profit initiatives 
built upon the principles of social solidarity and designed to provide financial protection 
against the impoverishing effects of health expenditure for low-income households in the 
informal urban sector and in rural areas (Ahuja and Jütting, 2004; Carrin et al. 2005; Tabor, 
2005; Jacobs et al., 2008).  
Matching the roll-out of these schemes, theoretical and especially empirical studies 
which examine their impact on outcomes such as utilization of healthcare, financial 
protection, resource mobilization and social exclusion have proliferated. Existing reviews of 
this body of work are provided by Jakab and Krishnan (2001), Preker et al. (2002) and 
Ekman (2004). Based on 45 published and unpublished works, Jakab and Krishnan (2001) 
conclude that there is convincing evidence that community health financing schemes are able 
to mobilize resources to finance healthcare needs, albeit there is substantial variation across 
schemes. They also argue that the schemes are effective in terms of reaching low-income 
groups although the ultra-poor are often excluded.3  Preker et al. (2002), reach a similar 
conclusion and point out that there is strong evidence that CBHIs are successful at 
mobilizing resources, enabling access to care for the poor and providing financial protection. 
 Although both these papers paint a positive picture of the potential of CBHIs in 
meeting their policy goals they also point out the need for stronger evidence on the 
performance of CBHIs as long-term viable health care financing instruments. As opposed to 
these two narrative reviews, Ekman (2004) provides a systematic review of the literature 
                                                 
3 While there are no universally accepted definitions of ultra-poor there are several context specific 
definitions. For instance, Lipton (1983) uses the term to indicate households who are not able to 
obtain more than 80 percent of their caloric requirements. Similarly, Ahmed et al. (2007) defines the 
concept in terms of daily income below USD 0.50 (at constant 1993 PPP USD).  
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based on 36 studies conducted between 1980 and 2002.4  Ekman (2004) finds that while 
CBHI do provide financial protection for low income groups and increase cost recovery for 
health service providers the magnitude of the effect is low and the lowest income groups are 
excluded from enrollment. Moreover, there is no evidence that the schemes are associated 
with an increase in the quality of care. On a methodological note, Ekman (2004) concludes 
that the evidence base to develop stylized facts is questionable and only five studies included 
in his review may be considered of high-quality.5 These studies are labelled high-quality 
studies primarily as they attempt to use econometric methods, albeit on cross-section data, to 
identify the effect of CBHI on various outcomes.  
Motivated by the continued attention given to such schemes as a way of financing 
health care, the aim of this review is to provide an updated and systematic assessment of 
studies that have examined the impact of CBHI schemes, and on the basis of this body of 
evidence take stock, among other issues, of the role of such schemes in enhancing access to 
health care and providing financial protection.  The paper relies on 46 micro level studies 
that have been published or have become publicly available between 1995 and 2012 and 
cover a range of low and middle income countries. Unlike the previous reviews, the current 
study focuses mainly on papers that have used quantitative methods to identify impact.6 The 
                                                 
4 Among others, a systematic review is characterized by a study protocol which lays out specific 
research questions to be addressed, pre-defined inclusion criteria for studies, a systematic search 
strategy to find and include studies that fulfil the criteria and an assessment of the quality/validity of 
the findings through an assessment of the methodological features of the literature.  
 
5 Of the 36 papers reviewed by Ekman (2004), five studies (Carrin et al., 1999; Criel and Kegels, 
1997; Jowett et al., 2003; Jutting, 2001; Ranson, 2002) are considered high-quality. The first two are 
based on descriptive statistics and the remainder use econometric methods. However, all three 
studies that use regression analysis are based on cross sectional data and only one study (Carrin et al., 
1999) uses longitudinal data.  
 
6 The definition of ‘impact’ is limited to examining the effect of CBHI schemes on the beneficiaries 
and does not include the impact on providers in terms of cost recovery and resource mobilization for 
the health financing system. 
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specific objectives of the study are to: (i) examine the impact of CBHI on inclusion of lower 
income groups and adverse selection in enrolment, on healthcare utilization and on OOP 
expenditure (ii) examine the extent to which variations in outcomes may be related to key 
scheme design characteristics – an issue which has policy implications but which has not 
been systematically investigated (iii) scrutinize the research methodology of the various 
studies and comment on the potential effects of the study design on the empirical findings.  
The paper unfolds by providing, in section 2, a description of the key characteristics 
of some common types of community based health insurance schemes. This is followed by 
an account of the protocol used to produce the review (section 3), findings are in section 4, 
and a discussion of methodological concerns appears in section 5. The final section 
concludes the paper.  
2. Community-based health insurance – a brief taxonomy  
Community-based health insurance is a generic term for a variety of resource 
mobilization models designed to finance access to health care through a greater involvement 
of the target population in the design and implementation of the scheme as compared to 
private or national-level health insurance schemes (for details see Jakab and Krishnan, 2001; 
Preker et al., 2002).   
The most common forms of community health financing schemes are (i) Community 
prepayment health organizations (ii) Provider based health insurance and (iii) Government-
run but community-involved health insurance. These schemes differ in terms of design and 
the involvement of the community in setting up the scheme, mobilizing resources, 
management and supervision.  The remainder of the section characterizes these different 
schemes and highlights the role of the community in each scheme type while Table 1 
provides a snapshot of various scheme characteristics. 
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2.1 Community prepayment health organizations 
These types of health organizations are characterized by voluntary membership and 
payments are made in advance in order to cover potential medical costs. Members of the 
schemes pay premiums on a regular basis, usually when their incomes are high. Such 
schemes are often initiated with the technical and financial support of NGOs and thereafter 
the community takes full responsibility for administering and managing the scheme. Local 
governments may also play a role in encouraging and supporting the efforts of such schemes. 
The community participates in designing the scheme and decides on the level of benefit and 
the corresponding premium. In addition, members participate actively in administration and 
supervision (Arhin-Tenkorang, 2001).  
Sixteen studies in the current review examine the impact of community prepayment 
health organizations (see Table 2). While such schemes often rank high in terms of 
community involvement they tend to cover a limited geographical area and often cover only 
cheaper outpatient care services due to difficulties associated with mobilizing a large enough 
population. While community involvement is a purported strength of this approach it is also 
a weakness as the establishment and continuity of such schemes depends on social solidarity 
and trust amongst community members.7 Poor management and accounting skills may also 
undermine the sustainability of such schemes.  
2.2 Provider based health insurance schemes 
  
These types of health insurance schemes are initiated by healthcare providers (such as a town 
or regional hospitals) to encourage utilization of healthcare services. This review contains 
seven studies which may be placed under this rubric (see Table 2). The schemes mainly cover 
                                                 
7 For instance, in such a scheme in Kenya’s Kilifi district, households reported that they were not 
interested in renewing their membership since they feel that corruption affects management 
(Molyneux et al., 2007). 
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expensive inpatient care and hospitals and may have recourse to external funds to subsidize 
service costs. In this framework, the health care providers are responsible for mobilizing 
resources and providing health care services. The role of the community in designing and 
administering the scheme is limited. However, members of the schemes are given a chance 
to participate in scheme supervision and provide feedback on service quality through 
meetings organized by the health care providers. Such schemes are often restricted to those 
households living in the catchment area of a health facility (see Arhin-Tenkorang, 2001).    
2.3 Government run community-involved health insurance 
Government run and community-involved health insurance schemes are often linked to 
formal social insurance programmes with the objective of creating access to a universal 
health care system (Jakab and Krishnan, 2001). Unlike other models, government initiated 
schemes often cover both basic curative and inpatient care. The government (national or 
regional) plays a substantial role in initiating, designing and implementation of such schemes 
(Arhin-Tenkorang, 2001). The participation of the community in such schemes varies 
substantially across countries. Some governments create conditions which enable community 
involvement in defining the benefit package, setting of premiums and scheme management 
while others introduce the schemes in a top-down manner and limit the role of the 
community. Membership in such government-initiated health insurance may not always be 
voluntary. Twenty five studies in this review fall in the category of government-run models 
of community health insurance schemes.8  
                                                 
8  The total number of studies reported here is 48 (i.e, 16 community prepayment health 
organizations, 7 health care provider initiated insurance schemes, and 25 government run and 
community involved health insurance schemes). However, Table 2 covers 46 studies. The difference 
is because the scheme type in one study (Onwujekwe et al. 2009) is not known and each of three 
studies (Desmet 1999, Diop et al. 2006, Gumber 2001) examines two different types of schemes. 
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Unlike other forms of CBHI, government supported health insurance schemes have 
the potential to reach a relatively large number of households. Governments in co-operation 
with donor agencies may provide reductions in premium and fee waivers for the poorest 
segments of society while retaining a universal benefit package. The disadvantage of these 
schemes may lie in their design and implementation features. Since such programmes are the 
result of a top-down approach, they may not be sensitive to local needs. Limiting the role of 
community participation in awareness-raising, decision-making and supervision probably 
robs such schemes of a sense of ownership which in turn may hamper sustainability.  
3. Conducting the review  
This study applies the basic principles of a systematic review in order to assess the literature 
on the impact of CBHI schemes.9 Unlike a narrative approach, systematic reviews attempt to 
assess the overall message or develop stylized facts on the basis of knowledge emerging from 
existing studies while at the same time controlling for or commenting on methodological 
features of the literature that may influence the conclusions. The protocol followed in this 
review is as follows: 
1. The specific research aim was defined as a review which will provide a synthesis of 
the existing knowledge on community health financing approaches in dealing with 
three issues - access to schemes or social inclusion, and their effect on health care 
utilization and financial protection. 
2. Source of the data: published and unpublished papers over a 18 year period (1995 to 
2012) located through a search of 6 databases — Econlit, PubMed, Science Direct, 
                                                 
9 The detailed protocols are described by Green et al. (2008). Ekman (2004) also uses a systematic 
review approach and adapts the methods proposed by Clark and Oxman (2002), AHRQ (2002), and 
McKee and Britton (1997).  
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SSRN, JSTOR, and Google scholar. In addition, a search was conducted on the web 
pages of the World Health Organization.   
3. To identify papers for review a search was conducted using the key words 
‘community health financing’, ‘micro-insurance’, ‘OOP payment and community 
insurance’, ‘community-based health insurance’. This generated a large number of 
papers (several hundred) whose titles and abstracts were examined and introductions 
and conclusions were perused for suitability of inclusion. Using this approach, 121 
potential papers were selected and passed to the second round for intensive reading.  
4. Papers included for detailed review needed to satisfy the following criteria: 
4.1 They should be concerned with an examination of the impact of community 
health financing schemes on access to health care and financial protection. 
The definition of ‘community health financing schemes’ was restricted to 
non-profit oriented schemes that serve populations in the informal sector 
(urban or rural) of low and middle income countries.10 This restriction led to 
the exclusion of 21 of the 121 papers. 
4.2 Studies that use micro data at the household or individual level (led to the 
exclusion of 12 studies).   
4.3 Studies that evaluate the effect of community health insurance mainly using 
quantitative and statistical analysis. Studies relying mainly on qualitative 
studies were included provided they used at least some statistical information 
(16 studies excluded).  
                                                 
10 According to the World Bank (2011) classification of economies based on 2010 GNI per capita, 
the countries covered in our review lie in one of the following categories: low income countries, 
$1,005 or less (like Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, and Mali); lower middle income countries, $1,006 - 
$3,975 (like India, Nigeria, and Lao); upper middle income countries, $3,976 - $12,275 (China and 
Mexico).  
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4.4 Studies that arrived at their findings based on value judgement and self-
perception without using any data were excluded. Similarly, studies that did 
not provide clear information on the research methods applied and the 
schemes studied in their analysis were excluded (7 studies excluded).  
4.5 The outcome measures should include utilization of health care (outpatient 
and inpatient) services, OOP healthcare payments, adverse selection, and 
social exclusion in enrolment and service utilization (19 studies excluded).  
The imposition of these criteria led to a list of 46 papers (32 published and 14 
unpublished) that were retained for the review.11 Compared to Ekman (2004), 37 of 
the papers included in the review are different.  
5. After paper selection, the papers were read and carefully scrutinized. A data 
extraction template was developed to collect information from each paper about 
scheme impact, the characteristics of the scheme (type of scheme, whether the 
scheme receives external support, whether there are contracts with providers, extent 
of community participation), the statistical/research methods applied, data 
characteristics (source, level of analysis, data type, the use of baseline information). A 
summary of the key features of each of these studies is provided in Table 2. 
6. Analysis: The limited number of studies impedes a formal meta analysis which links 
outcomes to scheme characteristics and study characteristics. However, to assess the 
overall message emerging from the studies, univariate and bivariate distributions 
were constructed. These are used to construct stylized facts. 
                                                 
11 All studies that meet the selection criteria are included in the review. In some cases the same 
scheme has been studied in more than one paper although over different time periods, study 
outcomes, and the use of different methods.  
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4. Review results  
The key data emerging from the review are laid out in Tables 3 to 6. A brief discussion on 
each of the issues under scrutiny is provided below.  
4.1 Participation, social exclusion and adverse selection 
Scheme participation, which is linked to cost-recovery, varies considerably across schemes 
and also within schemes across different sites. The largest scheme included in the survey 
covers 406 million individuals while the smallest includes only 600. Scheme coverage as a 
share of the target population, for the schemes that provide such information, ranges from 1 
percent to 100 percent. The unweighted mean is 37.2 percent (see Table 2). While this may 
not seem impressive, given the intended target for such schemes (rural and informal sector 
workers) and the potentially limited exposure to insurance/financial services this may be 
considered a high uptake rate.  
Turning to the issue of who participates, a majority of the papers (61 percent) find 
statistically significant evidence to support the claim that the ultra-poor are excluded from 
CBHI schemes. Even when such households become members, they tend to use healthcare 
services less intensively as compared to higher income groups potentially due to their 
inability to afford co-payments and other related costs (transportation and forgone income). 
About 67 percent (see Table 3) of the studies find evidence that individuals suffering from 
chronic health conditions are more likely to join CBHI schemes as compared to those in 
good health. While this may be expected and considered a positive aspect from the 
perspective of the beneficiaries, it also signals the need to account for such risks in the 
management of CBHI schemes. To control for adverse selection a number of schemes allow 
enrolment only at the household rather than the individual level and/or promote group 
registration at the village level. Other schemes introduce a waiting period before new 
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members can receive assistance in order to discourage opportunistic scheme uptake 
(Wiesmann and Jutting, 2001). 
4.2 Utilization of healthcare services 
Consistent with the results of previous reviews our analysis shows that 74 percent of the 
studies (26 out of 35) find positive and statistically significant CBHI membership effects on 
health care utilization. 12  The effect differs across the type of health care services and 
supports the idea that such schemes are somewhat more effective in extending access to 
outpatient as compared to inpatient care – 75 percent of the studies find an effect on 
outpatient care while the corresponding figure for inpatient care is 64 percent. In terms of 
magnitude, the increase in outpatient care utilization for insured versus uninsured ranges 
from 4.3 to 10.5 percentage points and for inpatient care utilization from 1.1 to 6.9 
percentage points. While the utilization of preventive and curative outpatient care may 
reduce the need for inpatient care (Yip et al., 2008) it is likely that the difference in the CBHI 
effect across types of care is due to differences in coverage for the two types of services. 
Several CBHI schemes do not cover both types of care and if they do, inpatient care 
coverage has a high co-payment arrangement which is like to dissuade health care use.  
4.3 Financial protection 
Sixteen studies have examined the impact of the schemes on out-of-pocket payment and 
seven papers looked at the effect of the schemes on catastrophic health expenditure. 56 
percent of such studies conclude that the schemes have been successful at reducing OOP 
healthcare payments and in 86 percent of the cases in preventing catastrophic health 
expenditure. For those papers where the effect is statistically significant, the reduction in 
OOP expenditure ranges between 12 to 35 percent.  
                                                 
12 Utilization includes three types of outcome measures (outpatient care, inpatient care and overall 
utilization). Some studies examine the impact of the scheme on outpatient and inpatient care 
separately while some group them together.  
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4.4 Scheme characteristics and scheme effects 
A clear feature emerging from the analysis is the high degree of variation in outcomes across 
schemes. The pertinent policy issue is perhaps not so much whether CBHI schemes enhance 
access and provide financial protection but what are desirable scheme design features. This is 
difficult to analyse as details on scheme design are not readily available, however, we attempt 
to do so by providing a tabulation of various scheme characteristics and their associated 
effects on the outcomes of interest (see Table 4).  
Scheme type: There appears to be a clear link between scheme type and outcomes. 
Government-run community-involved schemes appear to be less effective in terms of 
reaching out to marginalized groups as compared to community pre-payment schemes. Six 
of the 7 government-schemes tend to exclude the ultra-poor as compared to 5 of the 10 
community-run NGO-supported schemes. Consistent with this pattern the studies show that 
government-run schemes are somewhat more successful (11 out of 14) at ensuring health 
care use (conditional on enrolment) as compared to community-run (11 out of 16) schemes. 
We also find that government-run insurance interventions are more effective in providing 
financial protection for beneficiaries, although this does not account for the exclusion of the 
ultra-poor. 
External financing: CBHIs differ in their financing source. Some schemes are entirely 
dependent on member contributions while others receive external funds in order to ensure 
financial sustainability and to subsidise premiums for potential beneficiaries. Access to such 
funds appears to be positively associated with increase in utilization (17 out of 21) and 
reduction in OOP expenses (6 out of 9). Schemes with external support seem to be less 
effective in terms of reducing social exclusion (only 4 out of 11 studies with external funds 
finds a reduction in the inclusion of the poor). This pattern suggests that subsidies are 
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benefiting the relatively wealthier members of the community and highlights the need for 
more effective targeting of such funds. While access to external support may have a short-
run beneficial effect, continued reliance on such subsidies may undermine the sustainability 
of such schemes.  
Contract with providers: While some community health financing schemes do not place 
restrictions on obtaining medical treatment from health providers in a given geographical 
area others sign contracts with local providers and restrict access. Such arrangements may 
lead to price discounts although their effect on quality of care is not so clear. The review 
suggests that such contractual agreements increase utilization of health care and reduce the 
burden of OOP payments. Since almost all the schemes under review have signed agreement 
with providers it is hard to discern a provider effect.  
Community participation: In principle it would seem redundant to examine the link between 
community participation in community-based health financing as the target population is 
expected to be engaged in various aspects of such schemes. However, as discussed in section 
2, the extent to which potential beneficiaries participate in the design, implementation, 
management, and supervision activities varies across schemes. Providing space for 
community participation may have an impact on the willingness of individuals to buy 
insurance and the overall performance of the scheme. The review reveals that participation 
of the community in design and implementation has a positive impact on healthcare 
utilization and financial protection. For instance, all 9 schemes in which communities have a 
role in programme design are associated with an increase in access to healthcare and 4 out of 
5 display a reduction in OOP expenditure. The corresponding figures for schemes without 
such participation are 6 out of 11 and 1 out of 4 for utilization and OOP expenditure, 
respectively. Participation of members in management and supervision activities is also 
14 
 
linked with increases in access to healthcare service (7 out of 7) as opposed to 9 out of 14 for 
schemes where members are not involved.   
Link with microfinance institutions: As discussed above, several microfinance institutions provide 
micro insurance service for their members. Six studies in this review evaluate the impact of 
CBHI schemes which are embedded in microfinance institutions.13 Albeit the number is 
small, such schemes appear to be effective in terms of expanding utilization and in ensuring 
equitable access to health insurance.   
5. Methodological concerns  
So far the information and in particular the estimates obtained from the CBHI literature 
have been taken at face value. However, a reading of the papers raises at least two concerns, 
especially if the aim is to identify the causal impact of the schemes on various outcomes. 
First, in the case of most CBHI schemes, enrolment is voluntary and there is clear 
evidence of exclusion of the ultra-poor and the higher enrolment of individuals with existing 
medical conditions. However, many studies not account for this pattern of self-selection and 
hence ignores the consequences of estimating the impact of CBHI on health care use and 
financial protection based on self-selected samples. Without accounting for this pattern of 
self-selection it is difficult to argue that the estimates of CBHI on health utilization and 
financial access should be interpreted as causal effects.  
To provide a systematic assessment along this dimension, Table 5 groups the 
methods used in the reviewed studies into four categories. These consist of studies that (i) 
Control for potentially confounding observed and unobserved factors that may influence 
program outcomes and scheme uptake using techniques such as difference-in-difference 
                                                 
13 Gumber (2001), Ranson (2002), Dror et al. (2009), Ranson et al. (2006), Levine et al. (2012), and 
Hamid et al. (2011). 
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(DiD), Instrumental Variables (IV), and Heckman selection models (ii) Studies that have 
used econometric analysis (Propensity Score Matching, OLS, logit, probit) to control for a 
number of potentially confounding observed variables that may influence outcomes and 
scheme uptake (iii) Studies that have analysed differences in means of outcome variables 
across insurance status and tested whether these are statistically significant (iv) Studies that 
have analyzed differences in means without conducting any statistical test. Only 6 of the 43 
estimates on utilization, the most widely used outcome, fall in the first category. The most 
common approach is to control for a range of observed characteristics which may have a 
bearing on outcomes and on scheme uptake (19 of 43 in the case of health utilization) but to 
ignore (unobserved) selection effects.  The upshot is that, potentially, most of the studies in 
the review are likely to overestimate the effect of CBHI on utilization (since the analysis is 
based on samples predisposed to using more health care) and underestimate the financial 
protection effect (sample excludes the ultra-poor).  
Second, the bulk of the studies rely on a single or repeated cross-section data for 
their analysis. Only 6 of the 25 studies that apply regression methods have used panel data 
and 5 of these studies use baseline information (Table 6). Access to longitudinal data is 
important from a policy and a methodological perspective. Access to such data permits 
dynamic analyses and are essential to gauge the long-term feasibility of such schemes. At the 
same time longitudinal information makes it easier to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity/selection effects which may have a bearing on outcomes and enrolment.  
Based on his review, Ekman (2004) concluded that, “overall, the evidence base is 
limited in scope and questionable in quality” and only 5 of the 36 papers reviewed were 
considered high quality. Since then there has been a clear improvement in the quality of the 
literature. For instance, 25 of the 43 studies on utilization now use statistical regression 
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analysis, an important marker of quality in Ekman’s quality assessment protocol. However, 
the burden of proof needed to obtain convincing effects has also risen since 2004. Based on 
current standards a convincing causal analysis of interventions such as the CBHI calls for the 
use of baseline and follow up data, information on treatment and valid control groups and 
the use of appropriate statistical methods to control for the endogenous nature of CBHI 
participation. The current review shows that while still a minority, studies with such 
characteristics is increasing. Eight of the 46 studies reviewed here use baseline and follow-up 
data and control for self-selection effects. Five of these studies are based on data from China 
(Yip et al., 2008; Zhang & Wang, 2008; Wagstaff et al., 2009; Chen and Yan, 2012; Xuemei 
and Xiao, 2011). While Lu et al. (2012) examine the effect of Rwanda’s CBHI scheme, 
Levine et al. (2012) provide an assessment of a scheme in Cambodia and Parmar et al. (2012) 
examine a scheme in Burkina Faso.      
6. Summary and conclusion 
A number of community-based health insurance schemes are operating in several low and 
middle-income countries. Such schemes may be thought of as a hybrid between traditional 
risk sharing and market based insurance arrangements. Matching the increased attention paid 
to such health financing arrangements as a policy option, empirical studies assessing the 
effects of such schemes have also proliferated.  
The aim of this paper was to inform policy and research by providing a systematic 
review of the existing empirical evidence on the operation and effectiveness of such schemes 
with a focus on three outcomes – access to schemes, effect on health care utilization and 
effect on financial protection. In addition to summarizing the evidence, the paper analysed 
the link between key scheme design characteristics and their effect on outcomes and finally 
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commented on the quality of the empirical work. Our examination of the evidence yields a 
number of conclusions pertinent to both health policy makers and to researchers     
Despite their avowed aim of social inclusion, the review shows that the ultra-poor do 
not have access to CBHI schemes. Even if they do enrol, the lowest income groups are less 
likely to use health care services perhaps due to their inability to bear other costs 
(transportation and opportunity) associated with accessing health care. There is also 
considerable evidence that individuals with pre-existing health conditions are more likely to 
enrol, which leads to concerns about the sustainability of such schemes. The bulk of the 
studies find that access to CBHI is associated with increased health care utilization, especially 
with regard to the use of relatively cheaper outpatient care services (4 to 10 percentage point 
increase) as opposed to inpatient care. The schemes also appear to be associated, in about 
half the schemes, with a reduction in OOP expenditure (12 to 35 percent).  In short, there is 
evidence to back the claim that such schemes are responsible for enhancing access to health 
care services and providing a degree of financial protection. The more pertinent question is 
perhaps not whether such schemes work or not but whether there are specific scheme traits 
that are more conducive to generating desired outcomes.  
A relatively novel aspect of this review has been an assessment of the link between 
scheme design characteristics and effectiveness. We found that top-down government-run 
schemes appear to be better in terms of ensuring health care access and reducing OOP 
expenditure as compared to community-run schemes. However, community-runs schemes 
seem to be stronger in terms of reaching out to marginalized groups. Schemes that have 
access to external sources of financing, in addition to premiums, are more effective in 
providing financial protection and expanding access to healthcare services but not at 
reaching out to the ultra-poor. This pattern suggests that subsidies are more likely to flow to 
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the relatively better-off. A clear pattern, regardless of scheme type is that schemes where the 
community plays a role in scheme design and implementation are better at ensuring access to 
health care and financial protection – in turn, rather ironically, suggesting a greater need to 
bring in the community into scheme design and implementation.   
Notwithstanding the relatively positive stylized facts emerging from the review, the 
quality of the underlying research base needs to be carefully considered. While there have 
been clear methodological improvements in the body of work as compared to Ekman 
(2004), the burden of proof needed to judge the effectiveness of an intervention has also 
risen. There are three key concerns. First, the bulk of the papers are based on a single period 
cross-section data set. While such studies are useful there is a clear need to analyse scheme 
performance over time. Such dynamic analyses are essential in order to assess the long-term 
feasibility of a community-based health financing approach. Second, while there is a greater 
recognition of the need to control for self-selection in scheme uptake and to account for the 
endogeneity between CBHI uptake and outcomes, the bulk of the papers (37 out of 43) on 
utilization continue to ignore selection effects, which raises doubts about their internal 
validity. Third, baseline and (repeated) follow-up data are needed in order to identify causal 
effects and at the moment a limited set of papers use such data in their assessments of the 
impact of CBHI schemes. 
Notwithstanding the methodological concerns, given the consistency of the findings 
across the various papers at least with regard to health care utilization and financial 
protection, the accumulated evidence suggests that CBHI schemes play a limited but 
important role in ensuring greater access to health care and providing some measure of 
financial protection to a sub-set of workers in the rural and informal sector in developing 
countries.   
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However, from a methodological and more importantly from a policy perspective, 
future work needs to provide a more careful assessment of scheme design characteristics 
which impinge on scheme success and if possible, scheme roll-out and evaluation needs to 
be integrated so that baseline data and repeated follow-up data are readily available and may 
be used both to control for unobserved heterogeneity which may be driving scheme uptake 
and outcomes and to support longer-term analysis of such schemes. Increases in the quality 
of the evidence base are essential in order to provide a more credible data base on which to 
judge whether and what type of design features of community-based schemes offer a viable 
long-term health financing strategy.   
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Table 1: Features of different CBHI models  
Type of 
CBHI 
Design features Management 
features 
Organizational 
and institutional 
features  
Role of 
government 
and NGOs  
Role of the 
community 
Strong side of 
the scheme 
Weakness of the 
scheme 
Community 
prepayment 
health 
organizations 
Financed by 
contribution from 
members 
 
Small financial 
contribution 
mainly to cover 
primary health 
care services 
 
Membership is on 
a voluntary basis 
Strong community 
involvement in 
decision making and 
supervision 
The provider is 
not involved in the 
administration of 
the scheme 
 
The schemes may 
sign contractual 
agreement with 
local providers to 
obtain preferential 
prices and insure 
quality of services 
NGOs often 
provide technical 
assistance and 
provide start-up 
funds 
 
Governments 
provide legal 
recognition and 
encourage their 
establishment 
Pay premiums  
All round 
community 
involvement in 
design, 
implementation 
and supervision 
Trust and feeling 
of ownership 
Small size in nature 
and low ability to 
pool enough 
resources 
 
Lack of technical 
and managerial 
skills about health 
insurance 
administration 
Provider based 
health 
insurance 
schemes 
Designed by local 
health care 
providers 
(hospitals) to 
encourage service 
utilization  
 
Often cover 
expensive 
inpatient care 
Membership is on 
a voluntary basis 
 
 
Providers involved in 
scheme management  
Providers 
administer the 
schemes and 
collect premiums 
from  
 
Providers may 
obtain technical 
assistance from 
the government 
and NGOs.   
NGOs and 
governments 
may improve the 
facility of the 
providers 
Pay premiums  
 
Provide 
feedback on 
quality  
Does not require 
management and 
technical skills 
from the 
community 
 
Scheme 
management and 
service provision 
are integrated 
 
Limited scale 
 
Relatively low 
power of the 
community to 
influence benefit 
package and quality 
of care 
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Government- 
run 
community-
involved health 
insurance 
Designed by 
governments as 
part of the health 
financing system  
 
Often includes 
both primary care 
and 
hospitalization  
 
Membership may 
voluntary or 
mandatory 
Schemes are organized 
and managed through 
a top-down approach 
by central and local 
governments but the 
community may also 
be involved in decision 
making processes 
Government are 
strongly involved 
in the design, 
implementation, 
and evaluation of 
the scheme.  
 
Government and 
NGOs may 
subsidise the 
scheme and 
provide 
exemption from 
premium 
payment for 
lower income 
groups  
Pay premiums  
 
Communities 
may be 
involved in 
design and 
administration 
of the schemes 
The possibility of 
subsidized 
premiums  
  
Large size of 
scheme and 
enhanced 
sustainability 
 
 
Limited feeling of 
community- 
ownership 
 
Potentially high 
administrative costs  
Source: Adapted from Jakab & Krishnan (2001), Arhin-Tenkorang (2001) and Ekman (2004) 
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Table 2: List of papers included in the review 
Author(s)  Country 
 
Scheme  
 
Scheme
Type14 
Year of 
study 
Scheme 
coverage 
Outcome 
variable 
Method of 
analysis 
Findings Remarks 
     
Aggarwal (2010) India Yeshasvini  Gov’t 2007-08 3 million 
individuals 
Social 
exclusion 
Logit model Richer 
groups 
were more 
likely to 
enrol  
The study attempts to reduce selection bias but 
baseline differences between treatment and 
control groups are not controlled. 
Atim (2000) Ghana Nkoranza 
community health 
insurance Scheme 
Provider 1999 30% of 
population 
Adverse 
selection 
 Simple 
descriptive 
There is 
evidence 
for 
adverse 
selection 
The study compares the socio-economic status 
of insured households. 
Carrin et al. 
(1999) 
China RCMS Gov’t 1993 
&1995 
31 to 
100 % 
of pop. 
OOP 
payment 
Simple 
descriptive 
Reduction 
in health 
care costs 
  The study collects baseline information but   
  does not use it appropriately. The analysis on  
  financial protection effect is based on 
  descriptive analysis. 
Chee et al. (2002) Tanzania Hanang district 
health fund 
Gov’t 2001 2.8% of 
house- 
holds 
Outpatient 
care 
Simple 
descriptive 
  CBHI   
  members  
  more  
  likely to 
  use    
  services 
  The results are based on healthcare service 
  utilization data obtained from selected    
  providers and the sample may not be 
  representative. 
                                                 
14  ‘Scheme type’ indicates whether the scheme is a community prepayment health organization (Com’ty); Health care provider initiated insurance 
scheme (Provider) or a Government-run community-involved health insurance scheme (Gov’t).   
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Author(s)  Country 
 
Scheme  
 
Scheme
Type 
Year of 
study 
Scheme 
coverage 
Outcome 
Variable 
 
Method of 
analysis 
Findings Remarks 
Chen and Yan 
(2012) 
China URBMI Gov’t 2007 & 
2008 
n/a Social 
exclusion 
Random 
effects logit 
model 
Sig. pos. 
effect 
        The results are based on longitudinal data 
        which include baseline information 
Adverse 
selection 
Random 
effects logit 
model 
Sig. pos. 
effect 
Criel and Kegels 
(1997) 
Congo Bwamanda hospital 
health insurance 
Provider 1986-
1995 
41% of the 
population 
Inpatient care Descriptive 
statistics 
Sig. Pos.  
effect  
Does not control for differences between the 
socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of insured and uninsured 
groups. 
Desmet (1999) Bangladesh Gonosasthya Com’ty 1995 27.5% of  
households 
Inpatient care Simple 
descriptive 
Insured 
households use 
more curative 
care than non-
members  
Data is from healthcare providers. Does 
not control for differences between the 
characteristics of insured and uninsured 
households. 
Outpatient 
care 
 Simple 
descriptive 
Insured 
households use 
more 
hospitalization 
care than non-
members 
Grameen Provider 1994 41% Outpatient 
care 
Simple 
descriptive 
Insured 
households 
use more care 
than 
uninsured 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Author(s)  Country 
 
Scheme  
 
Scheme
Type 
Year of 
study 
Scheme 
coverage 
Outcome 
variable 
Method of 
analysis 
Findings Remarks 
     
Devadasan et al. 
(2007) 
India ACCORD Provider 2003-04 35% of the 
population 
Incidence of 
catastrophic 
OOP payment 
Simple 
descriptive 
Reduced 
from 8% to 
3.5%.  
The data were obtained from insurance 
claimants who were hospitalized during the 
study period. There is no control group. 
SEWA Com’ty 2003-04 20% of the 
population 
Incidence of 
catastrophic 
OOP payment 
Simple 
descriptive 
Reduced 
from 49% to 
23%.   
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Author(s)  Country 
 
Scheme  
 
Scheme
Type 
Year of 
study 
Scheme 
coverage 
Outcome 
variable 
Method of 
analysis 
Findings Remarks 
     
Diop et al. (2006) Ghana Nkoranza hospital 
insurance Scheme 
Provider 2004 n/a Social 
exclusion 
Logit model No effect The study does not control for the 
endogeneity of scheme participation. 
Outpatient 
care 
Logit model Sig pos. 
 effect 
Inpatient care Logit model No effect  
OOP payment Log-linear No effect 
Catastrophic 
OOP payment 
Log-linear Sig. neg.  
effect  
Mali Bla and Sikasso 
scheme 
Com’ty 2004 3.3 to 11.4 % 
of the 
population 
Social 
exclusion 
Logit model Sig. pos. 
effect 
Adverse 
selection 
Logit model Sig. pos. 
effect 
Outpatient 
care 
logit model Sig. pos. 
 effect 
OOP payment Log-linear No effect 
Senegal 26 Mutual Health 
Organizations 
Com’ty 2004 n/a Social 
exclusion 
Logit model Sig. pos. 
effect 
Adverse 
selection 
Logit model Sig. pos. 
effect 
OOP payment Log-linear No effect 
Catastrophic 
OOP payment 
Log-linear Sig. neg.  
effect  
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Dror et al. (2009) India UpLift Health Com’ty 2005 16,356 
individuals 
Social 
exclusion 
Descriptive 
statistics 
No effect In addition to the household survey, the study 
collects and uses information by interviewing 
managers of the scheme. However, the study 
does not control for differences in socio- 
economic and other household characteristics 
between insured and uninsured households. 
Inpatient Descriptive 
statistics 
Sig. pos. 
effects  
BAIF Com’ty 2005 600 
individuals 
Social 
exclusion 
Descriptive 
statistics 
No effect  
Inpatient Descriptive 
statistics 
Sig. pos. 
effects 
Nidan Com’ty 2005 10189 
individuals 
Social 
exclusion 
Descriptive 
statistics 
Non-insured 
people were 
wealthier than 
insured people 
Inpatient Descriptive 
statistics 
Sig. pos. 
effects 
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Dror et al. (2005) Philippines Six micro health 
insurance units 
n/a15 2002 n/a Adverse 
selection 
Simple 
descriptive 
No evidence 
of adverse 
selection  
The data has been collected though field 
surveys. Robustness of results has been 
examined. Evidence of selection bias, which 
is not controlled for. 
Inpatient care Descriptive 
statistics 
Sig. pos.  
effect  
Ekman (2007) Zambia Prepayment 
scheme 
Gov’t 1998 n/a Catastrophic 
OOP payment 
Logit model Sig. increase in 
the risk of 
catastrophic 
payment16 
In order to check the robustness of the 
finding, the study employs several sensitivity 
analysis for alternative definitions of the 
outcome variable and model specifications.   
Franco et al. 
(2008) 
Mali Four mutual health 
organizations in Bla 
and Sikasso 
 Gov’t 2003-04 3.3 to 11.4 % 
of the 
population 
Social 
exclusion 
Logit model No effect Does not control for selection bias. 
Outpatient 
care 
Logit model Sig pos.  
effect  
OOP payment OLS Sig. neg. 
effect  
Gala  rraga et al. 
(2010) 
Mexico Seguro Popular 
(SP) 
Gov’t 2006 44% of 
households 
OOP Payment Instrumental 
variables  
Sig. neg. effect  The study applies instrumental variables 
techniques on cross sectional data to 
deal with endogeneity and self-selection 
problems in insurance enrollment 
decisions. 
                                                 
15 There is no clear information on establishment and management of the schemes 
16 This result is obtained for a broader definition of health care spending (i.e., for both direct medical payments for health providers and indirect health 
related costs). In the case of a narrower definition of health care spending (i.e., only direct payments), the scheme reduces the risk of catastrophic 
expenditure.    
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Gnawali et al. 
(2009) 
Burkina 
Faso 
Nouna CBI Com’ty 2006 5.2 % of 
households 
Social 
exclusion 
Logit model Sig. pos. 
effect 
The study applies PSM on cross-section data. 
Does not control for unobserved differences 
between treatment and control. 
Outpatient 
care 
PSM Sig. pos. 
effect  
Inpatient care PSM No effect  
Gobah and Liang 
(2011) 
Ghana ADMHIS  Gov’t 2010 63.5 % of the 
population 
Utilization  Descriptive 
statistics 
Sig. pos. 
effect 
Both quantitative and qualitative data used for 
analysis   
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Gumber (2001) India SEWA Com’ty 1998-99 63,000 
individuals 
Social 
exclusion 
Multinomial 
logit 
No effect The study is based non- randomly selected data. 
In addition, it is not clear why the author uses 
multinomial logit model to examine the 
determinants of enrolment to SEWA scheme.  Adverse 
selection 
Multinomial 
logit 
Mixed 17 
Outpatient 
Care  
Multinomial 
logit 
Sig. pos. 
effect 
Inpatient  
Care  
Multinomial 
logit 
No effect 
OOP payment OLS No effect 
ESIS Gov’t 1998-99 n/a Outpatient 
Care  
Multinomial 
logit 
No effect 
Inpatient  
Care  
Multinomial 
logit 
Sig. pos. 
effect 
OOP payment OLS Sig. neg. 
effect 
Mediclaim Com’ty 1998-99 n/a Outpatient 
Care  
Multinomial 
logit 
No effect 
Inpatient  
Care  
Multinomial 
logit 
No effect  
OOP payment OLS Mixed 18  
 
                                                 
17 No significant difference between members and non-members in terms of previous chronic illness or hospitalization history. However, married 
individuals, who expected need for maternal care are more likely to become members of the scheme.   
18 The Mediclaim insurance plan is associated with a significant increase in out-of-pocket payment for hospitalization care. However, the scheme does 
not significantly affect out-of-pocket payment for ambulatory (outpatient) care.  
35 
 
Author(s)  Country 
 
Scheme  
 
Scheme
Type 
Year of 
study 
Scheme 
coverage 
Outcome 
variable 
Method of 
analysis 
Findings Remarks 
     
Hamid et al. 
(2011) 
Bangladesh Grameen Bank Provider 2006 n/a Utilization Probit 
model 
Sig. pos. 
effect  
The paper considers endogeniety and spill-over 
effects of the programme. However, lack of 
longitudinal data limits the ability of the paper to 
deal with such issues. 
Ito and Kono 
(2010) 
India Yeshasvini  Gov’t 2008 n/a Adverse 
selection 
Probit 
model 
Mixed 19 The study does not control for the quality and 
quantity of health care supply  
Jowett et al. 
(2003) 
Vietnam Vietnam' s 
voluntary insurance 
Gov’t 1999 20% of 
individuals 
OOP payment Heckman, 
OLS 
Sig. neg. 
effect  
The paper addresses scheme self-selection bias 
using cross-section data. 
Jutting (2003) Senegal Les mutuelles de 
santé 
Com’ty 2000 37.4 to 
90.3% of  
households  
Social 
exclusion 
Probit 
Model 
Sig. pos. 
effect  
The study pays limited attention to potential bias 
due to unobservable factors that may drive 
scheme uptake.  
Jutting (2004) Senegal Les mutuelles de 
santé 
Com’ty 2000 30 000 
individuals 
OOP payment Log-linear Sig. neg. 
effect  
The study emphasises endogeniety and self-
selection issues. 
Inpatient care Logit model Sig. pos. 
effect  
Lammers and 
Warmerdam 
(2010) 
Nigeria Health Insurance 
Fund (HIF) 
Com’ty 2008 6% of the 
population 
Social 
exclusion 
  Logit  
  Model 
Sig. pos. 
effect 
Based on cross-section data. Conducts a 
sensitivity analysis. 
Adverse 
selection 
  Logit model Sig. pos. 
effect 
Levine et al. 
(2012) 
Cambodia SKY Health 
Insurance 
Com’ty 2007-
2008 
n/a Utilization  IV, ITT   Sig. pos. 
effect 
Randomised control and use of longitudinal 
household data which includes baseline 
information 
OOP payment IV, ITT Sig. neg. 
effect 
 
 
                                                 
19 Households with a larger share of sick members are significantly more likely to join the scheme but households with sick household heads are less 
likely to apply for membership.  
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Liu et al. (2012) China NCMS Gov’t 2006 85 to 91.3 % 
of the 
population 
Outpatient 
care 
Descriptive 
statistics 
No effect   
Inpatient care Descriptive 
statistics 
Sig. pos. 
effect 
Vietnam  CHI, VHI Gov’t 2006 49.4 to 52.7 
% of the 
population 
Outpatient 
care 
Descriptive 
statistics 
Sig. pos. 
effect 
Inpatient care Descriptive 
statistics 
Sig. pos. 
effect 
Lu et al. (2012) Rwanda Mutuelles Gov’t 2000-
2008 
More than 
90% of the 
population 
Utilization Random 
effects logit 
model, IV  
Sig. pos. 
effect 
The authors use panel data for child and 
maternal care analysis. They use pooled data for 
general population medical care utilization and 
catastrophic health spending analysis. Matching 
is used to control for self-selection bias in 
insurance uptake and endogenous household 
expenditure while examining financial risk 
protection.  
Catastrophic 
OOP payment 
IV, Logit 
model 
Sig. neg. 
effect 
Msuya et al. 
(2007) 
Tanzania Igunga district 
health insurance 
fund 
 Gov’t 2000 n/a Social 
exclusion 
Probit model Sig. pos. 
effect 
The conclusions are based on one regression per 
outcome variable. No sensitivity analysis. Does 
not deal with self-selection issues. 
 Utilization Probit model Sig. pos. 
effect  
Nguyen et al. 
(2011) 
Ghana NHIS Gov’t 2007 45 % of the 
population 
OOP payment Two part 
model 
(Probit + 
log-linear) 
   Sig. neg. 
   effect20 
No attention is paid to self-selection bias in 
insurance uptake.  
 
Catastrophic 
OOP payment 
Probit 
model 
  Sig. neg.  
  effect 
                                                 
20 The effect of the scheme on OOP payment is only significant at 10 percent and the magnitude is small (reduction in health expenditure is equal to 
1.25 percent of non-food household consumption). 
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Noterman et al. 
(1995) 
De Congo Masisi referal 
hospital 
Provider 1987-
1990 
26.8% of the 
population 
Inpatient care       Simple   
    descriptive 
Increase in 
hospital 
admission21  
The study uses an experimental approach. 
However, the program was not implemented 
randomly across eligible households, there is 
evidence of adverse selection. 
Onwujekwe et al. 
(2009) 
Nigeria Anambra state 
CBHIs 
Gov’t   n/a n/a Social 
exclusion 
Descriptive 
statistics 
No effect  The SES of the respondents is not properly 
defined. 
Parmar et al. 
(2012) 
Burkina 
Faso 
Assurance maladie 
à base 
communautaire 
Com’ty 2004-
2007 
n/a Adverse 
selection 
Fixed effects Mixed 22 The study uses panel data to examine adverse 
selection overtime. 
Ranson (2002) India Women’s 
Association’s 
Medical Insurance 
Fund 
Com’ty 1994-
2000 
23,214 
individuals 
Catastrophic 
OOP 
 
Descriptive 
statistics 
Reduced 
from 35.6 
percent  to 
15.1 
percent23 
 
Paper is based on data from reimbursement 
claims submitted between 1994 and 2000. 
Ranson et al. 
(2006) 
India Self-Employed 
Women’s 
Association’s 
(SEWA) 
Com’ty 2003 103,000 
individuals 
Social 
exclusion 
Simple 
descriptive 
The scheme 
is 
inclusive24. 
The study uses well-argued measures of socio 
economic status in order to see the impact of 
the schemes across different income groups. 
However, it does not deal with self-selection 
issues. 
                                                 
21 Hospital admission among subscribers increased by 157 percent and among non-subscribers increased by 31 percent between 1987 to 1988, the first 
period of the prepayment experiment.  
22 Adverse selection is detected only in 2007 mainly due to a subsidy premium offered to poor households. 
23 The share of claimants for whom health expenditure would have been catastrophic (more than 10 percent of annual household income) 
24 32 percent of rural members and 40 percent of urban members are from the bottom 30th percentile of socioeconomic status.  
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Rao et al. 
(2009) 
Afghanistan Parwan and Saripul 
Community Health 
Funds 
Gov’t 2004 & 
2006 
1 to 38 % of  
households 
Outpatient Simple 
descriptive 
CBHI 
members use 
more care25 
This study uses longitudinal data with baseline 
information. However, the paper applies 
descriptive analysis and does not use the panel 
data to control for differences between control 
and treatment groups. OOP payment Descriptive 
statistics 
Increase in 
OOP 
payment26  
Robyn et al. 
(2011) 
Burkina 
Faso 
Nouna District 
CBHI scheme 
Com’ty 2007 8.6% of the 
population 
Utilization  PSM Sig. pos. effect  Despite the lack of panel data, the paper tries to 
to deal with selection on observables by 
minimizing differences between treatment and 
control groups. 
Saksena et al. 
(2011) 
Rwanda Mutuelles Gov’t 2005-06 74% of the 
population 
OOP payment Ordered  logit 
model 
Sig neg. 
effect27  
The results are based on cross sectional data and 
there is no sensitivity analysis. Paper checks for 
endogeneity of enrolment using a Durbin–Wu–
Hausman test, which is unable to reject 
exogeneity of enrolment. 
Catastrophic 
OOP payment 
Simple 
descriptive 
Reduces the 
risk of 
catastrophic 
health 
expenditure28 
Schneider and 
Diop (2001) 
Rwanda Byumba, Kabgayi, 
and  Kabutare 
prepayment plan 
pilot 
Gov’t 2000 6.1 to 10.6% of 
the population 
Utilization Logit model Sig pos. effect  The paper does not pay attention to endogeneity 
of enrolment. A single regression is estimated 
for each outcome variable. OOP payment Log-linear Sig neg. effect  
Sekyi and 
Domanban 
(2012) 
Ghana NHIS Gov’t 2008 More than 
42 % of the 
population 
Outpatient 
care 
Logit model Sig. pos. 
effect 
Only limited set of number of individual and 
household level controls.  
                                                 
25 CBHI members utilization constitutes from 29 to 90 percent of the total curative care utilization 
26 After the introduction of community health fund, OOP payment generally increased in the intervention province 
27 Despite the model produces insignificant negative effect of the scheme to reduce out-of-pocket expenditure as the share of capacity-to-pay, the 
authors conclude that the scheme provides financial protection for members. 
28 The incidence of catastrophic OOP payment was about four times less among insured households as compared to uninsured households.  
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Senchanthixay 
(2005) 
Lao Sisattanak district 
CBHIs 
Gov’t 2004 & 
2006 
n/a Outpatient 
care 
Simple 
descriptive 
Increase in 
outpatient 
visits by 52 
percent  
Simple mean comparisons (without any 
statistical test) are used. Does not control for 
difference in income and individual 
characteristics of insured and uninsured patients.   
 Inpatient care Simple 
descriptive 
Decrease in 
inpatient 
admission 
by 3.5 
percent 
Shimeles (2010) Rwanda Mutuelles Gov’t 2005-
06 
85 % of the 
population 
Social 
exclusion 
Probit 
model 
Sig. pos. 
effect 
Despite the lack of longitudinal data, a range of 
methods are applied and the robustness of the 
findings are tested using alternative parametric 
regressions and propensity score matching 
techniques. 
Utilization PSM, probit 
model 
Sig. pos. 
effect  
Catastrophic 
OOP payment 
PSM, probit 
model 
Sig. neg. 
effect  
Sun et al. (2009) China Shandong province 
medical scheme 
Gov’t  2004 94.6% of 
the 
population 
Catastrophic 
OOP payment 
Simple 
descriptive 
Decrease in 
catastrophic 
OOP 
payment 
The study is based on comparing health 
expenditure before and after reimbursement of 
insurance claims without any control group. 
Wagstaff et al. 
(2009) 
China NCMS Gov’t 2003 & 
2005 
406 million 
individuals 
Outpatient 
care 
DID with 
PSM 
Sig. pos. 
effect 
The study is based on household surveys before 
and after the intervention from treatment and 
control sites (counties). The study also uses 
heath facility data. Exploiting the panel nature of 
the data, the study uses difference in difference 
with matching method to control for potential 
bias from observable covariates and 
unobservable time invariant confounders.  
OOP payment DID with 
PSM 
No effect29 
                                                 
29 This is for total out of pocket payment. The programme significantly reduces OOP payment for deliveries and increases expenditure for outpatient 
visits and inpatient care.  
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Wang et al. 
(2005) 
China Fengshan 
Township CBI 
Gov’t 2002 n/a Social 
exclusion 
Logit model 
and OLS 
Sig. pos. 
effect 
 
Adverse 
selection 
Logit model 
and OLS 
Sig. pos. 
effect 
Xuemei and Xiao 
(2011) 
China NCMS Gov’t 1991-
2006 
n/a Utilization Fixed 
effects, IV, 
Logit model 
No effect30 This study uses six years of panel data, before 
and after NCMS implementation.  
Yip et al. (2008) China Rural Mutual 
Health Care 
(RMCH) 
Com’ty 2002&
2005 
60000 
individuals 
 
Outpatient 
care 
DID, PSM Sig. pos. 
effect  
The paper uses appropriate methods and data 
from longitudinal household surveys canvassed 
before and after the intervention from both 
treatment and control groups. Inpatient care DID, PSM No effect  
Zhang and Wang 
(2008) 
China Fengsan Township 
CBHI scheme 
Com’ty 2002 - 
2006 
n/a Social 
exclusion 
DID Sig. pos. 
effect 
The results are based on a 4-year longitudinal 
survey. Random effect logit models are used to 
control for potential sources of bias. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 The paper finds that enrollment in insurance does not increase either the probability of visiting doctors or utilization of preventive health services.  
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Table 3:  Effect of CBHI on outcomes 
Outcome  Schemes displaying an effect  
% N          Total 
Utilization 74.3 26 35 
     Outpatient care 75.0 9 12 
     Inpatient care 64.3 9 14 
OOP healthcare payment 56.3 9 16 
    Catastrophic OOP  85.7 6 7 
Social exclusion 61.1 11 18 
Adverse selection 66.7 6 9 
Notes: Effect indicates whether the studies find (i) statistically significant and positive effects of 
CBHI schemes on utilization of health care (ii) statistically significant effects in terms of reducing 
OOP payment (iii) whether the poor are statistically less likely to access CBHI and (iv) whether those 
with existing ill-health conditions are statistically more likely to access CBHI.  
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Table 4: The effect of scheme characteristics on outcomes  
 Scheme displaying an effect 
   Utilization OOP Payment Social Exclusion 
     % N Total    % N Total   % N Total 
Scheme Type:          
     Gov’t 78.6 11 14 75.0 6 8 85.7 6 7 
     Community 68.8 11 16 42.9 3 7 50.0 5 10 
     Provider 75.0 3 4 0.0 0 1 0.0 0 1 
External funda          
     Support  81.0 17 21 66.7 6 9 63.6 7 11 
     No support  75.0 3 4 50.0 1 2 100 3 3 
Contract with providers          
     Signed agreement 82.6 19 23 63.6 7 11 63.6 7 11 
     No agreement  100 1 1 0.0 0 0 75.0 3 4 
Community participation          
     Part. in designb 100 9 9 80.0 4 5 75.0 3 4 
     Not part. in design 54.5 6 11 25.0 1 4 66.7 4 6 
     Part in implementationc 100 7 7 100 2 2 33.3 2 6 
     Not part. in implementation  64.3 9 14 28.6 2 7 66.7 6 9 
Microfinance linked schemesd  83.3 5 6 50.0 1 2 0.0 0 4 
Notes: aExternal fund indicates any financial support to the scheme from governments or any 
development organization in order to (partially) cover administrative costs or to provide subsidized 
premiums. b Participation in design stage indicates that the target population was given a chance to 
participate in the establishment of CBHI schemes.c Participation in implementation indicates that 
members of the community are involved in managing and supervising schemes.d Schemes that are 
linked to existing microfinance services.  
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Table 5:  Research methods  
 
Method 
Utilization OOP health 
expenditure 
Social 
Exclusion 
Adverse 
selection 
% N % N % N % N 
   DiD/ IV/Heckmana 14.0 6 29.4 5 10.5 2 27.2 3 
   Logit/ PSM/Probit/OLSb 44.2 19 58.8 10 63.2 12 54.5 6 
   Descriptive with  
   statistical test 
23.3 10 5.9 1 21.1 4 0.0 0 
 Descriptive without  
    statistical test 
18.6 8 5.9 1 5.3 1 18.2 2 
Notes: a DiD-Difference-in-differences, IV - Instrumental variables; b PSM - Propensity score 
matching, OLS - Ordinary least squares. 
 
Table 6:  Study characteristics and outcomes  
(only studies that apply regression analysis) 
 
Study characteristics 
Utilization OOP health 
expenditure 
Social 
Exclusion 
Adverse 
selection 
% N % N % N % N 
Data type          
        Cross-section                                  76.0 19 86.7 13 85.7 12 66.7 6 
        Panel 24.0 6 13.3 2 14.3 2 33.3 3 
Baseline information 20.0 5 13.3 2 14.3 2 33.3 3 
Notes: The following papers rely on panel data and baseline information to examine utilization, Yip 
et al. (2008), Levine et al. (2012), Lu et al. (2012), Wagstaff et al. (2009), and Xuemei and Xiao (2011); 
OOP health expenditure, Levine et al. (2012) and Wagstaff et al. (2009); Social exclusion, Zhang and 
Wang (2008) and Chen and Yan (2012); Adverse selection, Zhang and Wang (2008), Parmar et al. 
(2012), and Chen and Yan (2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
